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ABSTRACT 
We examine the effect of taxation on financing policy using the 
corporate tax reform in 2001 in Croatia as a natural experiment. 
Since the extant literature on tax effects on capital structure studies 
listed firms in developed countries, it is worth investigating whether 
the same results apply to privately-held, small and medium sized 
firms (SMEs) in transition economies. The findings provide 
significant evidence that lower taxes affected the capital structure of 
Croatian firms, which resulted in increased equity levels and 
decreased long-term debt levels.  We also find that smaller and more 
profitable firms were more likely to reduce their debt levels.  These 
findings are consistent with the trade-off theory of capital structure, 
which suggests that lower taxes decrease the incentive to hold debt 
due to decreasing interest tax deductibility. 
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Taxation and Capital Structure: 
evidence from a transition economy 
 
 
1. Introduction 
During the last decade, there has been a wave of tax system reforms across 
Eastern Europe. Although economic models predict a variety of effects from 
corporate taxation in terms of factor allocation, financing choices and 
investment patterns, there is little empirical evidence from transition 
economies. Our study contributes in this field by investigating the unique case 
of Croatia’s corporate tax reform in 2001 and its effect on the capital structure 
of private firms. Focusing on private SMEs, we find that equity levels were 
increased while long-term debt levels were decreased following the substantial 
reduction of the corporate tax rate from 35% to 20%. 
Interestingly, among the determinants of capital structure, taxation is probably 
the most debated. According to the influential trade-off theory of debt, the 
optimal level of debt in a firm’s capital structure is determined by the balance 
of the tax shield provided by debt and the present value of financial distress 
costs (Myers, 2003). More specifically, there is positive relationship between 
the corporate tax shield and firm value given that each increase in the debt 
portion of a firm’s capital structure decreases the after-tax cash flow. On the 
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other hand, when excessive amount of debt has been accumulated by the firm, 
it risks a default resulting in the transfer of control to the creditors and the 
incurrence of deadweight costs which further reduce firm value (Frank and 
Goyal, 2008). Thus, the lower the tax advantages of debt, the lower the optimal 
debt-equity ratio. 
Despite trade-off theory’s straightforward appeal, empirical tests have 
produced mixed results. More specifically, the empirical evidence for a tax-
effect on capital structure has been less than definitive due to (a) the difficulty 
of calculating accurately the marginal tax benefits, which are influenced by 
non-debt tax shields and various tax rules, and (b) the limited availability of 
non-US firm data on statutory corporate tax reforms. Regarding empirical tests, 
Givoly et al. (1992) find a positive relation between changes in US corporate 
taxes and changes in leverage, as well as a substitution effect between debt and 
non-debt tax shields as a result of the Tax Reform Act of 1986. Graham and 
Harvey (2001) interview 392 CFOs in the U.S. and find that the tax advantage 
of interest deductibility is of significant concern by CFOs in large, regulated, 
and dividend-paying firms. Ayers et al. (2001), using a sample of small U.S. 
firms (i.e., <500 employees), find a negative relationship between effective tax 
rate and debt. In particular, they find a negative effect of marginal tax rates on 
the use of outside debt (loans from non-owners), and no effect of marginal tax 
rates on the use of inside debt (loans from owners). Notably, this evidence 
comes exclusively from publicly listed U.S. firms. As with many aspects of 
firm financing, bankruptcy costs and asymmetric information in financing 
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decisions of firms in transition and developing countries remain unclear 
(Prasad et al., 2005). 
Figure 1 Distribution of effective average tax rates in Croatia pre- and post- 
the corporate tax reform 
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Note: The distributions are derived from the sample of 14,049 firms utilized in the paper. ‘Before’ and 
‘After’ corporate tax reform refer to 1998-1999 and 2002-2003 periods, respectively. 
 
Figure 2 Distribution of ‘Equity to Assets’ ratio in Croatia pre- and post- 
the corporate tax reform 
(A) BEFORE CORPORATE TAX REFORM (B) AFTER CORPORATE TAX REFORM 
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Note - The distributions are derived from the sample of 14,049 firms utilized in the paper. ‘Before’ and 
‘After’ tax reform refer to 1998-1999 and 2002-2003 periods, respectively. 
 
Using data on Croatian firms, this paper contributes to the literature by 
demonstrating that − in line with the trade-off theory of debt − firms increased 
their equity levels as a result of a corporate tax reform. In 2001, Croatia 
drastically cut its corporate tax rate from 35% to 20%, primarily to promote 
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private sector growth and attract foreign investment [Note: The General Tax 
Law (NN No. 127/00), that contained the Law on Corporate Profit Tax, was 
voted in December 2000 and took effect in January 1, 2001]. This exogenous 
change in the statutory tax rate was immediately translated into a lower 
effective tax rate (i.e., taxes divided by pre-tax income). Using the sample of 
Croatian firms in this study, Figures 1 and 2 illustrate how the mean and 
median effective tax rate dropped substantially, while the ratio of ‘Equity-to-
Assets’ increased, after the corporate tax reform. These changes provide an 
intuitive indication of a possible relation that ought to be tested further 
controlling for firm characteristics in order to account for firm-specific factors 
influencing the choice of capital structure. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 outlines the 
motivation for this study. Section 3 describes the sample design and estimation 
methodology while Section 4 presents the findings. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Motivation 
There are several reasons for which the Croatian corporate tax reform offers a 
unique natural experiment on the impact of corporate taxes on firms’ capital 
structure choice due to decreased interest tax deductibility: 
First, cases of substantial corporate tax changes without concurrent changes in 
personal taxation are unusual, and economic research has traditionally dealt 
with minor changes in corporate tax policy that yielded mixed findings 
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(Auerbach, 2002). In the United States, the Tax Reform Act of 1986 had mixed 
results because the maximum statutory tax rate decreased from 46% in 1986 to 
34% after 1988, but simultaneous changes in several tax rules raised the 
fraction of corporate income taxable at the maximum rate (Gordon and 
MacKie-Mason, 1990). In developed European countries, corporate tax reforms 
have occurred, albeit either gradually (e.g., France after 1985) or with policy 
reversions, which complicate the study of a tax effect (e.g., in 2001, Italy 
substantially reversed the corporate tax reforms of 1997). Similarly, the wave 
of flat-tax reforms in Eastern Europe in the context of tax competition with the 
aim to boost economic growth and foreign direct investment is difficult to 
evaluate in terms of firms’ capital structure choice since these corporate tax 
changes happened either too recently to evaluate (e.g., Slovakia in 2004, 
Romania in 2005) or simultaneously with dramatic overhauls of the personal 
taxation systems (e.g., Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania in the 1990s). 
Second, since the literature on tax effects on capital structure deals with listed 
firms in developed countries, it is worth investigating whether the same results 
apply to SMEs in transition economies. Smaller private firms have higher 
bankruptcy costs and face different agency problems than publicly listed firms, 
thus influencing debt capacity and the ability to increase equity (Ang, 1992). At 
the same time, in transition economies the banking sector is often the sole 
avenue for external finance since alternative external financing mechanisms are 
underdeveloped.  
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Third, the 2001 tax reform in Croatia extended little to personal taxation, thus 
making it easier to identify a corporate tax effect on firm financing.1 Although, 
a number of special allowances and separate schedules were announced for 
certain groups of taxpayers (Urban, 2006), the aggregate amount of personal 
tax reliefs in constant prices remained roughly the same during the 2001-2004 
period (Bratic, 2006). Also, except for the highest income quintile, the changes 
in the standard tax schedule did not affect the actual average personal tax rate 
(Bratic, 2006). Moreover, despite a change in dividend taxation (i.e., before the 
reform, dividends and shares in profit were tax exempt, while after the reform 
they were taxed at the rate of 15 percent), it is unclear whether this change 
affected entrepreneurs’ decision to receive income in the form of salary rather 
than dividends, given that the corresponding tax brackets of the personal 
income taxation were equal or higher compared to the dividend tax (i.e. 15%-
25%-35% versus 15%).2  
Fourth, the elimination of the ‘Allowance for Corporate Equity’ (ACE) scheme 
in 2001 does not adversely affect our results. On the contrary, since the ACE 
allows neutrality between finance by debt and finance by equity (Devereux and 
Sorensen, 2005; Keen and King, 2002), the elimination of ACE would create a 
debt-bias, typical of standard tax systems, thus allowing a stronger test of the 
corporate tax reform’s positive effect on the equity choice of Croatian firms. 
                                                 
1
 The tax advantage of debt is increasing in the corporate tax rate and decreasing in the personal tax rate 
(Miller, 1977). This is because, at the personal level, interest income is taxed at a rate that is typically 
higher than the tax rate on returns from common stock. Thus, holding personal taxation constant, the 
effect from corporate tax rate reform would be unambiguous.  
2
 Similarly, the introduction of the dividend tax does not necessarily lead corporations to finance their 
activities largely through retained earnings (Poterba and Summers, 1985; Zodrow, 1991). 
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Another important issue is that the elimination of the ACE after 2001 did not 
broaden the tax base substantially; Klemm (2007) suggests that there is weak 
evidence that ACE in Croatia had an effect on tax revenues, while in Keen and 
King’s (2002) review of Croatia’s tax system, it is reported that 86.3% of the 
population of profitable firms in 1998 was subject to taxation after estimating 
the profit tax base with ACE. This could be attributed to the fact that the 
imputed rate on the equity under the ACE scheme was equal to 5 percent plus 
the inflation rate of industrial product prices, a rate that was deemed as rather 
low by many tax experts in Croatia (Svaljek, 2005), since the protective interest 
rate should ideally be equal to the interest rate on risk-free investments which is 
difficult to estimate in the absence of developed capital markets in Croatia in 
the 1990s.3 
Fifth, Croatia’s banking system quickly recovered after the brief crisis of 1998, 
resulting in increased credit availability and decreased loan rates that enhanced 
the access and use of debt by firms (Kraft, 2000). In particular, the ratio of 
private credit to GDP increased from 38% in 1998 to 54% in 2004, while bank 
long-term loan rates for enterprises decreased from 14.5% in 1998 to 6% in 
2004.4 Also, the rapid development of the capital markets in Croatia provided 
equity capital to listed firms, thus easing bank-based financing for non-listed 
firms, which are the sole focus of this study. In this context of substantial 
financial developments, a possible decrease in the debt levels of Croatian firms 
                                                 
3
 Keen and Kling (2002) acknowledge this criticism, but suggest that the rate was about right (namely 
“not too high, not too low”). 
4
 Sources: World Bank, Croatian National Bank 
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would strengthen our argument of a negative effect on debt financing due to the 
corporate tax reform. Furthermore, it is easier to investigate the effect of 
taxation changes in private Croatian companies because they did not have the 
size, organizational structure, or the global activity to receive cross-border 
finance, all of which would make them subject to alternative tax rules.5 
 
3. Data and empirical methodology 
We focus on the non-financial private sector in Croatia, using a sample of 
private (non-listed), unconsolidated, non-state-owned Croatian firms from the 
BvD Amadeus dataset (version: Jan. 2005). The data includes all formal-sector 
(registered) firms and was collected by Creditreform Croatia, which reports 
that the data in Amadeus covers about 33% of the private sector (the remainder 
is mostly informal firms). Amadeus’ full coverage of Croatian firms begins in 
1997. We create an unbalanced panel for 1998, 1999, 2002 and 2003, thus 
covering a period of two years before and after the corporate tax reform in 
2001. We do not consider 2001 because firms may not have changed their 
capital structure in the first year of the reform due to the transaction time that is 
needed to issue new equity or debt.6 The period between 1998 and 2003 
provides a unique window of opportunity to study the effect of corporate 
                                                 
5
 In contrast, large multinationals and dual-resident companies are typically engaging in cross-border 
tax arbitrage in order to take advantage of differences in corporate income tax rules between 
countries when double-taxation is absent. This extends to financing, where specific types of 
financing (e.g. international corporate bonds, currency swaps, hybrid instruments that have 
characteristics of both equity and debt) are sourced from countries with favourable tax conditions. 
6
 Notably, the findings in this paper are robust to the inclusion of years 2000 and 2001. 
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taxation in Croatia; before 1997 Croatia had a higher corporate tax rate, while 
after 2004 there were some further changes in dividend and personal taxation.7 
We start with a sample of 71,748 firm/year observations for years 1998, 1999, 
2002 and 2003. First, we drop 3,678 observations of financial firms, state-
owned enterprises, publicly-traded firms, firms with consolidated statements, 
and firms operating in Free Trade Zones.8 Next, we drop 1,737 observations of 
firms with incomplete financial data.9 We also drop 43,824 observations with 
zero or less than 2 percent long-term debt to assets ratio since they represent 
special cases of firms that may not have access to long-term financing (typical 
of small infant firms or firms in remote post-conflict locations in transition 
countries), and as a result cannot be expected to reduce their debt levels as a 
result of the corporate tax reform.10 Finally, since tax benefits of debt exist only 
for profitable firms, the sample excludes 8,460 observations of firms that 
registered losses.11 Our final sample includes 14,049 firm-year observations. 
This sample of private Croatian companies reflects mostly micro and small 
                                                 
7
 The new Corporate Income Tax Act (NN 177/04) became effective from 1/1/2005. Further changes in 
corporate taxation were introduced in 2005 and 2006 (i.e., NN 90/05 and NN 57/06). 
8
 Based on Croatia’s Law on Free Zones (NN 44/96 and later NN 92/05), companies in Free Trade 
Zones enjoy special tax treatment. The initial Amadeus sample contained 233 firm-year observations 
from private companies operating in Free Trade Zones. Also, since 96.9% of the companies in our 
sample are micro and small firms, it is highly unlikely that these firms could have utilized tax 
incentives included in the Investment Incentives Law (NN No. 73/00), which offered tax reductions 
for investments of over €1.5 million that created at least ten new jobs. 
9
 We can safely assume that the observations with missing data are random, given that t-tests between 
these firms and the firms in the final sample reveal no significant differences in the dependent and 
independent variables. 
10
 Despite the arbitrary nature of the 2 percent cutoff rate, the results are robust to alternative cutoff 
rates (e.g., 5%, 10%). Importantly, our results are robust to the inclusion of these observations, but 
the magnitude of the effect is lower. 
11
 Our results are robust to the inclusion of these observations (assuming that the effective tax rate of 
firms with losses is zero). 
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firms (EU definition12). In the robustness checks we also include firms with 
registered losses or with ‘LT Debt-to-Assets’ ratio of less than 2 percent; both 
the significance and the sign of the findings from the reduced sample of 14,049 
remain unchanged with the wider sample of 66,333 firms. 
The central hypothesis tested in this paper is that capital structure choices 
change after a reduction in corporate taxes, ceteris paribus, due to decreasing 
tax shield benefits on earnings. In particular, based on the trade-off theory of 
debt, a decrease in corporate taxes reduces the optimal debt level. Moreover, 
this relation is expected to be stronger in smaller firms (due to arbitrage 
opportunities between personal and business taxation as well as higher 
bankruptcy probability compared to larger firms) and more profitable firms 
(because they are in better position to repay their existing debt and use retained 
earnings as marginal source of funding for investments).  
In order to capture the effect of statutory tax change on capital structure, we 
utilize the accounting-based effective tax rate (ETR) –the ratio of income tax 
expense to pretax financial accounting income– which has been widely utilized 
in the taxation literature (Buijink et al., 2002; Callihan, 1994; Omer et al., 
1991; Shackelford and Shevlin, 2001; Shevlin, 1999). Unlike the economic-
theory-based effective tax rates, this accounting-based ETR reflects the 
complexities of the tax system since it is based on the actual source of finance 
                                                 
12
 Recommendation 2003/361/EC was adopted by the EU Commission and asserted firm size 
classification based on either employment, sales or assets. For instance, the assets criterion divides 
firms into micro (less than €2m), small (between €2m and €10m), medium (between €10m and 
€43m) and large (over €43m). Based on this criterion, the unbalanced panel employed in this 
research contains 83.6% micro, 13.3% small, 2.7% medium and 0.4% large firms.  
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and asset structure of individual firms and accounts for the fact that some firms 
cannot always make use of all their allowances against tax (Chennels and 
Griffith, 1997), thus providing a measurement for actual overall tax burden of 
Croatian firms. Although the accounting-based ETR is firm-specific, it does 
reflect tax burden changes across the entire corporate sector since the aggregate 
ETR approximates the statutory tax rate. As shown in Figure 1, on average the 
ETR approximates the statutory tax rate (35% and 20% before and after the 
reform, respectively) and small variations can be attributed to a variety of tax 
deductions/credits pertinent to specific incentives, accelerated depreciation, tax 
loss carry provisions, and tax penalties, among other reasons. 
With respect to the empirical methodology, we apply the following panel-data 
specification with firm fixed-effects:  
itttitiit ETRXY εγβα +⋅+⋅+=
    [1] 
where Y  is interchangeably 






Assets
Debt  termLong
 and 






Assets
Equity
, i
α
 denotes firm-
specific effects, X  is a vector of control variables, ETR is the accounting-based 
effective tax rate, and ε  denotes the residuals.13  
Regarding control variables, we utilize a series of variables that have been 
found previously to influence financing decisions (i.e., non-tax explanations of 
                                                 
13
 We interchangeably utilize long-term debt and equity as dependent variables, since Amadeus does 
not clearly indicate short-term debt (i.e., variable ‘Loans’ under the category ‘Current liabilities’ 
uniformly contains missing observations) for Croatian firms. Nevertheless, these two dependent 
variables are sufficient to identify an effect of taxation reform on capital structure, since long-term 
debt is highly correlated with short-term debt, and the level of equity reflects nondebt liabilities with 
tax-relief capacity. Notably, in the case of the Croatian private firms included in the BvD Amadeus 
dataset, “Non-current liabilities” with “Long-term debt” could be considered equivalent, since the 
observations for “Other non-current liabilities” appear either zero or missing.   
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capital structure). Firm size, in terms of the natural logarithm of total sales, 
captures the differences in informational and ex ante costs of financial distress 
(Bancel and Mittoo, 2004; Graham, 2000; Klapper et al., 2002). The ratio of 
‘fixed assets to total assets’ influences the cost of debt due to collateral 
considerations (banks tackling moral hazard and adverse selection by seeking 
collateral – Graham, 2000; Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981), especially in transition 
countries were banks increasingly rely on hard information from financial 
statements rather than soft data gathered over time through relationship lending 
(Haas et al., 2007). Following Graham (2000), we use return on assets and 
current ratio as measures of cash flows and liquidity, respectively, which have 
a crucial effect on firm borrowing since firms with poor cash flows and 
liquidity are in higher need of debt. At the same time, firms with higher 
profitability can use retained profits thus relying less on external finance. 
 
Table 1 Summary Statistics 
 Total sample  Sample before tax 
reform 
 Sample after    
tax reform 
          
Variable Mean Median S.D.  Mean S.D.  Mean S.D. 
          
Sales (Kuna mil.) 20.796 5.125 114.41 17.338 122.61 23.285 108.07 
Fixed assets/Total assets 0.321 0.285 0.22 0.312 0.22 0.327 0.22 
Return on assets 0.105 0.069 0.11 0.115 0.11 0.098 0.10 
Current ratio 1.853 1.280 3.07 1.861 3.78 1.847 2.44 
Effective Tax Rate (ETR) 0.307 0.270 0.16 0.372 0.15 0.258 0.15 
          
Note - Summary statistics are presented for the independent variables used in the regression analyses. The 
pooled sample contains an unbalanced panel of 14,049 observations for years 1998, 1999, 2002 and 2003. 
‘Before’ and ‘After’ tax reform refer to 1998-1999 and 2002-2003 periods, respectively. Data were 
obtained from BvD Amadeus. Firm sales are calculated in local currency and adjusted for inflation. 
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Table 1 presents the summary statistics for all the independent variables used in 
the estimations. In order to capture firm-specific costs of financial distress as 
well as managerial entrenchment, we introduce firm-specific effects (MacKie-
Mason, 1990, Jensen, 1986). Moreover, with firm fixed-effects we effectively 
account for product market and industry considerations, which could influence 
firm capital structure due to industry concentration (Chevalier, 1995; Phillips, 
1995), dependence on intangible or specialized assets (Rajan and Zingales, 
1995; Titman and Wessels, 1988), location, and volatility of cash flows 
(Graham, 2000). Finally, year dummies are included in order to control for 
different economic cycles or other systemic changes. 
 
4. Analysis of results 
Table 2 reports the estimation results. The effective tax rate (ETR) is positive 
and significant, both as a standalone and as an interaction term with the firm 
size, thus indicating that the tax reform in Croatia had a significant effect on 
firms’ capital structure. Moreover, it is found that the effect of corporate tax 
reform is declining with firm size. Separate estimations for four size quartiles 
of firms (based on total assets) show that the effect is stronger and highly 
significant for firms in the two smallest categories, but becomes weaker and 
insignificant for the two larger categories. Larger firms seem to be less 
sensitive to the tax reform because they enjoy more tax exemptions, deductions 
and allowances (Kesner-Skreb et al., 2001), as well as regressive compliance 
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costs due to corporate taxation (Blazic, 2004). The declining effect of taxation 
reform in larger firms is also confirmed by the positive and significant 
coefficient for the interaction between ETR and firm size. Also, as expected, 
the positive and significant effect from the interaction between ETR and 
accounting performance illustrates that after the tax reform the more profitable 
firms were particularly keen to reduce their debt levels. 
 
Table 2 Regression analysis of ‘LT Debt to Assets’ ratio 
 Dependent Variable: (LT Debt / Assets) 
Full Sample Q1: 
(Smallest) 
Q2 Q3 Q4: 
(Largest) In d ep en d en t  
Va r ia b les  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Intercept 0.118** 
(2.23) 
-0.063 
(1.01) 
-0.057 
(0.91) 
-0.200 
(1.25) 
-0.145 
(0.63) 
-0.212 
(1.17) 
0.148 
(1.20) 
ln(Sales) -0.000 
(0.14) 
0.013*** 
(3.29) 
0.013*** 
(3.20) 
0.021* 
(1.91) 
0.015 
(1.00) 
0.019* 
(1.66) 
-0.003 
(0.40) 
Fixed assets / 
Total assets 
0.269*** 
(23.49) 
0.275*** 
(24.07) 
0.274*** 
(24.05) 
0.336*** 
(12.60) 
0.252*** 
(9.06) 
0.304*** 
(12.25) 
0.265*** 
(11.26) 
Return on assets -0.123*** 
(6.75) 
-0.16*** 
(8.38) 
-0.23*** 
(7.30) 
-0.095** 
(2.48) 
-0.169*** 
(3.81) 
-0.137*** 
(3.55) 
-0.155*** 
(3.44) 
Current ratio 0.015*** 
(20.56) 
0.016*** 
(21.30) 
0.016*** 
(21.36) 
0.014*** 
(10.33) 
0.036*** 
(12.81) 
0.024*** 
(9.71) 
0.012*** 
(7.91) 
ETR 0.037*** 
(3.96) 
0.198** 
(2.08) 
0.165* 
(1.72) 
0.064*** 
(2.70) 
0.056** 
(2.39) 
0.030 
(1.62) 
0.027 
(1.62) 
ETR  
ln(Sales) 
— 
-0.012** 
(2.04) 
-0.011* 
(1.82) 
— — — — 
ETR  Return 
on assets 
— — 
0.305*** 
(2.87) 
— — — — 
Firm fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year effects No Yes Yes No No No No 
        
Observations 14049 14049 14049 3512 3512 3512 3513 
 R2  0.189 0.167 0.167 0.194 0.211 0.187 0.140 
Notes: Fixed-effects regressions for an unbalanced panel of private (non-listed), unconsolidated, non-
financial, non-state Croatian firms with positive return on assets, for the years 1998, 1999, 2002 and 
2003. Observations for 2000 and 2001 are omitted because they reflect the transition period from one 
corporate tax regime to another. Absolute values of t-statistics are reported in parentheses. Asterisks 
represent statistical significance at the 1% (∗∗∗), 5% (∗∗), 10% (∗) and 15% () levels. Columns 4-7 
present results for the four size categories (i.e. quartiles) based on firm sales in each specific year. The 
median firm size (total sales) for each quartile is (Q1: 1.23), (Q2: 3.29), (Q3: 7.94) and (Q4: 30.14). 
The reported R2 does not include the effect of the firm dummies. 
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The control variables also offer interesting findings. In line with theoretical 
predictions, firm performance, as measured by return on assets, has a negative 
effect on long-term debt. This negative relation indicates that firms fund 
internally using retained earnings. Also, the size, liquidity and portion of fixed 
assets in a firm are positively related to levels of long-term debt to assets since 
larger firms have more need for debt, while firms with higher liquidity and 
collateral capacity have easier access to debt.  
Table 3 Regression analysis of ‘Equity to Assets’ ratio 
 Dependent Variable: (Equity/Assets) 
In d ep en d en t  Va r ia b les  (1) (2) (3) 
Intercept -0.001 
(0.03) 
0.581*** 
(11.45) 
0.584*** 
(11.52) 
ln(Sales) 0.014*** 
(4.58) 
-0.030*** 
(9.32) 
-0.030*** 
(9.38) 
Fixed assets/Total assets 0.101*** 
(9.95) 
0.071*** 
(7.67) 
0.071*** 
(7.66) 
Return on assets 0.324*** 
(19.92) 
0.450*** 
(29.71) 
0.411*** 
(16.16) 
Current ratio 0.013*** 
(19.91) 
0.011*** 
(17.52) 
0.011*** 
(17.55) 
ETR -0.122*** 
(14.88) 
-0.134* 
(1.72) 
-0.152* 
(1.94) 
ETR  ln(Sales) — 0.009* 
(1.77) 
0.009* 
(1.90) 
ETR  Return on assets — — 0.164* 
(1.90) 
Firm effects Yes Yes Yes 
Year effects No Yes Yes 
    
Observations 14049 14049 14049 
 R2  0.226 0.176 0.177 
Note: see notes of Table 2. 
 
In order to further substantiate the results, we repeat estimation [1] using  
‘equity-over-assets’ as the dependent variable. This specification is equivalent 
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to using total liabilities to assets, which is a broader measure of borrowing, 
incorporating non-debt liabilities with tax-relief capacity and short-term debt. 14 
The results, presented in Table 3, show a significant negative relation between 
ETR and equity levels, meaning that equity levels increased after the corporate 
tax reform in 2001, particularly in smaller firms and more profitable firms.15 In 
sum, Tables 2 and 3 provide strong support that indeed equity (and not short-
term debt or any other form of liability) increased and long-term debt decreased 
in private Croatian firms as a result of the corporate tax reform in 2001. 
In addition, as we pointed out in Section 3, we repeat the estimations including 
in the sample firms with negative performance (Table 4: Columns 1 and 3), as 
well as firms with ‘LT Debt-to-Assets’ ratio of less than 2 percent (Table 4: 
Columns 2 and 4). These companies were excluded from the initial estimations. 
Despite the dramatic increase of the sample, the sign and the significance of the 
findings remain the same, thus demonstrating the apparent effect of corporate 
tax reform on the Debt/Equity ratio of Croatian firms. Finally, our results are 
robust to: 
 replacing the ETR variable with a lagged ETR variable to address possible 
forward timing of financing decisions (MacKie-Mason, 1990); 
 performing alternative estimation methodologies such as quantile regression 
(see Appendix 1), and OLS with differences across the 2001 reform, such as 
∆(Xt-Xt-3); 
                                                 
14
 Equity is equivalent to the ‘Total shareholders funds’ variable in BvD Amadeus and is the sum of 
capital stock, additional paid-in capital, reserves, retained earnings and premiums. It is verified that 
the this variable is equal to the difference between ‘Total Assets’ and ‘Total Liabilities’. 
15
 This increase in equity is particularly strong for additional paid-in capital, reserves, and retained 
earnings. This can be illustrated with separate estimations having ‘Other shareholders funds’ 
variable (from BvD Amadeus) as a dependent variable. ‘Other shareholders funds’ is the sum of 
additional paid-in capital, reserves, retained earnings and premiums. Results available upon request. 
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 utilizing alternative samples, such as a balanced panel to avoid attrition (see 
Appendix 2), or an unbalanced panel that includes observations from years 
2000 and 2001. 
 
Table 4 Robustness check – Inclusion of firms with losses and firms with 
low LT Debt/Assets ratio 
 
Dependent Variable:                     
(LT Debt /Assets) 
 Dependent Variable:  
(Equity/Assets) 
Independen t  Variab les  (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
Intercept 0.451*** 
(20.07) 
— 
-0.141*** 
(5.40) 
0.139*** 
(7.84) 
ln(Sales) -0.020*** 
(17.76) 
0.057*** 
(59.25) 
0.019*** 
(14.95) 
-0.001 
(0.89) 
Fixed assets/Total assets 0.212*** 
(25.38) 
0.476*** 
(76.21) 
0.217*** 
(24.02) 
0.255*** 
(38.16) 
Return on assets -0.179*** 
(15.87) 
-0.222*** 
(22.64) 
0.536*** 
(38.63) 
0.519*** 
(67.33) 
Current ratio 0.016*** 
(12.69) 
0.014*** 
(36.56) 
0.011*** 
(6.67) 
0.023*** 
(14.25) 
ETR 0.026*** 
(3.35) 
0.114*** 
(14.74) 
-0.119*** 
(14.57) 
-0.102*** 
(19.46) 
Industry effects Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Year effects Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
      
Observations 22509 66333  22509 66333 
 R2  (Pseudo-R2) 0.195 (0.250)  0.276 0.323 
Note: OLS (columns 1, 3 and 4) and Tobit (col.2) regressions with firm clustering. Firms with 
negative returns are included and their ETR value is assumed to be equal to zero. All estimations 
include firm industry (2-digit SIC) and year effects (not shown). See also notes in Table 2. 
 
5. Conclusions 
Utilizing Croatia’s corporate tax reform in 2001 as a natural experiment, this 
study suggests a significant effect of corporate taxation on capital structure by 
demonstrating that lower taxes in Croatia resulted in lower firm leverage. 
Overall, the corporate tax reform in Croatia provides strong evidence for a tax 
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effect on firms’ financing policy. These findings are consistent with the trade-
off theory of capital structure, which suggests that lower taxes decrease the 
incentive to hold debt due to decreasing interest tax deductibility. Notably, the 
current study focuses on the sign and the significance of the effect from tax 
reform without making any further claims on the magnitude of the change in 
debt/equity ratios, because the firm- and time-varying adjustment speed of 
capital structures complicates the exact identification and economic 
interpretation of a magnitude (Nivorozhkin, 2005). 
From a policy perspective, it could be argued that the reduction in corporate 
debt after the corporate tax reform could have impacted firms’ access to 
finance. Just like other transition economies, Croatia has a bank-based financial 
system where low levels of debt financing are typically a supply-side 
phenomenon given the preferential bank financing towards state-owned 
enterprises and large firms. By reducing the optimal debt level, the tax reform 
may have -indirectly- enhanced SMEs’ access to finance. This was important 
since access to finance was one of the major obstacles for Croatian firms. More 
specifically, based on surveys from the European Bank of Reconstruction and 
Development (EBRD), the portion of private SMEs in Croatia that reported 
obtaining financing from banks as a major obstacle in their operations was 
reduced from 48% in 1999 to 28% in 2005.16 Besides access to finance, the 
observed post-reform reduction in the average of debt loading for the average 
SME may also have contributed to lowering the probability for default on its 
                                                 
16
 Source: EBRD - Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey for 1999 and 2005. 
  19 
debt. In fact, from 2000 to 2004, the bank ‘non-performing loans to total loans’ 
ratio in Croatia’s banking sector was steadily reduced from 9.5% to 4.6%.17 
The findings are also important from a policy perspective since they originate 
from SMEs at a time when the SME sector is a fast-growing and highly 
leveraged segment in transition European countries. Moreover, the finding that 
Croatian firms substantially increased their equity portion in their capital 
structure in the years immediately after the corporate tax reform indicates a 
speedy adjustment toward target financial leverage. Similarly, the statistically 
significant interactions between the effective tax rate and firm size/performance 
illustrate that firm-specific effects may also affect the rate of adjustment and 
explain the variation across firms (Flannery and Rangan, 2006). 
This paper belongs to the growing empirical literature utilizing exogenous 
policy changes in firms’ environment in order to examine the trade-off theory 
of debt,18 thus responding to Myers’ (1984: p. 588) challenge during his 
presidential address to the American Finance Association in 1984, in which he 
stated, “I know of no study clearly demonstrating that a firm’s tax status has 
predictable, material effects on its debt policy.” The findings in this study 
promote the potential for innovative research on corporate taxation in transition 
economies, such as whether corporate tax reforms affect the long-run demand 
for capital and firms’ investment patterns. 
                                                 
17
 Source: IMF - Global Financial Stability Report (2005). 
18
 See Frank and Goyal (2008) for review of this literature. 
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Appendix 
 
A.1. Quantile regression estimates of the effect of corporate tax reform on 
‘Equity to Assets’ ratio of Croatian private firms 
-0.20
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-0.10
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0.00
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Quantile regression 
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Note: The figure depicts the positive effect of tax reduction on equity (as a portion of equity in capital 
structure) due to the corporate tax reform. In particular, coefficients for the ETR variable from nine quantile 
regressions (at 0.10, 0.20, 0.30, 0.40, 0.50, 0.60, 0.70, 0.80, 0.90 quantiles) are plotted along with the 
coefficient from panel-data fixed-effects estimation effects (horizontal line). The sample and specification 
are the same with that utilized in Table 3 (Column 1). All estimates are significant at the 1 percent level  
 
 
A.2. Robustness check – Regression analysis with balanced panel 
 
Dependent: (LT Debt /Assets)  Dependent: (Equity/Assets) 
In d ep en d en t  Va r ia b les  (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
Intercept 0.182** 
(2.02) 
0.011 
(0.10) 
-0.125 
(1.53) 
0.117 
(1.26) 
ln(Sales) -0.006 
(1.02) 
0.006 
(0.88) 
0.020*** 
(3.98) 
0.004 
(0.67) 
Fixed assets/Total assets 0.298*** 
(15.57) 
0.303*** 
(15.86) 
0.123*** 
(7.14) 
0.117*** 
(6.87) 
Return on assets -0.129*** 
(4.30) 
-0.329*** 
(6.32) 
0.291*** 
(10.83) 
0.594*** 
(12.77) 
Current ratio 0.025*** 
(13.18) 
0.026*** 
(13.89) 
0.033*** 
(19.69) 
0.031*** 
(18.42) 
ETR 0.043*** 
(2.72) 
0.297* 
(1.75) 
-0.161*** 
(11.34) 
-0.491*** 
(3.24) 
ETR  ln(Sales) 
— 
-0.019* 
(1.82) 
 — 
0.025*** 
(2.72) 
ETR  Return on assets 
— 
0.777*** 
(4.70) 
 — 
-1.171*** 
(7.92) 
Firm fixed-effects Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
      
Observations 3420 3420  3420 3420 
 R2  0.162 0.153  0.343 0.340 
Note: Fixed-effects regressions for a balanced panel of 855 private (non-listed), unconsolidated, non-
financial, non-state Croatian firms with positive return on assets for years 1998, 1999, 2002 and 2003. 
See also notes in Table 2. 
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